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Abstract 
In the late 90's, after severe financial and economic crisis, accompanied by inflation and 
exchange rate instability, Eastern Europe emerged into two groups of countries with 
radically contrasting monetary regimes (Currency Boards and Inflation targeting). The task of 
our study is to compare econometrically the performance of these two regimes in terms of 
the relationship between inflation, output growth, nominal and real uncertainties from 2000 
till now. In other words,  we test the hypothesis of non-neutrality of monetary and exchange 
rate regimes with respect to these connections. In a whole, the empirical results do not allow 
us to judge which monetary regime is more appropriate and reasonable to assume. EU 
enlargement is one of the possible explanations for the numbing of the differences and the 
lack of coherence between the two regimes in terms of inflation, growth and their 
uncertainties. 
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1. Introduction 
In the late 90's, after severe financial and economic crisis, accompanied by inflation and 
exchange rate instability, Eastern Europe emerged into two groups of countries with 
radically contrasting monetary regimes. The first group was formed by the countries with 
Currency boards and strongly fixed exchange rate regimes (Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and 
partly Latvia) and the second one was composed of Inflation targeting countries (Poland, 
Czech Republic, Hungary and later Romania). The reasons behind these choices were 
complex. One of leading arguments was the belief about the ability of two regimes to 
provide low inflation and to anchor inflationary expectations. This was viewed as a 
prepequisite for successful nominal and real convergence towards the EU integration and as a 
whole for sustainable economic growth. Over time, and especially with the launching of 
accession process and subsequently the EU membership, the differences in achievement and 
performance of both groups began to be increasingly subtle and unsystematic. This, in turn, 
undermined the importance of choosing one or another monetary regime and gave reasons to 
believe that the hypothesis of neutrality of the monetary regime can not be rejected. 
The task of the present study is to compare econometrically the performance of these 
two regimes in terms of the relationship between inflation, inflation uncertainty, nominal and 
real uncertainty from 2000 till now. In other words,  we test the hypothesis of non-neutrality 
of monetary and exchange rate regimes with respect to these connections. The article is 
constructed in three sections. The first section presents the theoretical foundations of the 
study, especially the main characteristics of both monetary regimes as well as the major 
theoretical relationships between nominal and real uncertainty. In the second section we set 
out and discuss empirical results. In the last section we conclude. 
2. Theoretical framework 
As already pointed out the choice of both polar regimes -  Currency boards and Inflation 
targeting was dictated primarily by the necessity to curb inflation, to fix inflation expectations 
and to accelerate growth.   In this line of reasoning credibility of the monetary regime, and its 
ability to establish discipline were the leading motives behind the choice of individual 
countries. Monetary regime is the primary institutional anchor that is systemic in nature, 
 not only to inflation but also to the overall developments of the economy. 
There is little doubt that both monetary regimes, namely Currency Board and Inflation 
targeting are very contrasting in their mechanics. The aim of Currency board is to import 
credibility and discipline from abroad by legally fixing exchange rate to the leading foreign 
currency and by means of full monetary base coverage with liquid foreign reserves. The 
monetary policy is eliminated because the balance sheet of central bank contains no domestic 
assets.   The Central bank cannot perform open market operations, although some elements of 
monetary policy are available through the manipulation of reserve requirements and banking 
regulation. Currency Board relies on an automatic link between balance of payments 
and money supply, real exchange rate and interest rates are supposed to quickly address all 
imbalances. Balance sheet separation of the Treasury from the Central bank, obligates the 
government to pursue conservative fiscal policy, and as a rule to maintain fiscal surpluses and 
low public debt. Proponents of Currency board consider that it produces high levels of 
discipline and credibility. 
Likewise, Inflation targeting pursues the same objectives (high credibility and 
discipline), but with others, and above all internal to the country mechanisms. These are 
clearly defined inflation target, transparency,  as well as active conduct of monetary policy. It 
relies on good knowledge of the economic model and transmission mechanisms. In purely 
  
theoretical terms Inflation targeting requires fully floating exchange rate.
1
 Supporters consider 
this monetary regime appropriate to combine the power of enhancing the level of fiscal 
discipline and credibility without eliminating the possibility for discretionary reaction in 
shocks. 
Focusing on our sample countries we can say that Currency Board regimes are generally 
small and highly open peripherals economies pursuing quick integration into the monetary 
system of the developed European countries. For example, Currency boards in Estonia (1992) 
and Lithuania (1994),  were introduced at the beginning of transition, the main objective 
explicitly was to break the influence of Russia and the Russian economy. Bulgaria, in turn, 
introduced Currency board  in mid (1997) after deep financial and monetary crisis, period 
of hyperinflation and sharp devaluation of national currency.
2
 Here the main task was to break 
with years of inflation, monetary instability and lack of structural reforms. In this sense, the 
choice of the Currency Board in Bulgaria can also be seen as a decisive geostrategic 
integration into the European monetary zone. Turning to the three countries with Inflation 
targeting  (Poland,  Czech Republic and Hungary, and to some extent Romania)
3
, we see that 
they have the characteristics of Central European countries,  they have some traditions in an 
economic and monetary policy prior to period of communism, and clear aspirations for 
independent and equal cooperation with leading European economies.   Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary began the transition with a fixed rate  (to varying degrees) and 
progressively gained knowledge and experience in implementing monetary policy. These 
are countries that put much effort in building macroeconomic models serving the base for the 
later implementation of Inflation targeting regime. The case of Romania is somewhat 
peculiar. Romania has a number of characteristics similar both to Central European countries 
as well to Bulgaria that explains oscillations and late implementation of inflation targeting.  
Turning to the theory, the multi-dimensional relationship between inflation, output 
growth as well as their uncertainties has been widely discussed in the literature.
4
 Since a 
complete set of hypotheses is large, the empirical studies separately cover several aspects of 
this nexus. To begin with the inflation and nominal uncertainty relationship, Friedman’s 
(1977) rule assumes a positive association between these two variables. Turning to the 
empirical literature, it mainly supports the Friedman’s view of positive inflation effects on 
nominal uncertainty. As the survey results of Golob (1994) show that 17 out of 21 studies find 
a positive impact of inflation on nominal uncertainty.
5
 Nevertheless, an alternative strand of 
literature argues that high inflation increases the cost of uncertainty and hence forces the 
agents to invest more time in predicting future prices (Frohman et al. 1981). Higher cost of 
ignorance, in terms of wealth and income loss, necessitates better information about these 
variables and hence high inflation becomes more predictable. 
Concerning the feedback effect from uncertainty to inflation; two opposing sets of 
hypotheses have been forwarded by the literature. According to the first view that has been 
advanced by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), higher uncertainty augments inflation by raising 
the short run benefits of inflation uncertainty. Notwithstanding the aversion of a long run 
higher inflation, policy maker seeks short run objectives of higher output from inflation 
surprises. This increases optimal inflation level in an economy. This positive relationship, 
                                                 
1
 In practice the small and open economies such as in Eastern Europe still monitor and intervene on the foreign 
exchange market. 
2
 Latvia carried out a similar policy of a fixed exchange rate; it is not the subject of our reflections notably 
because it does not represent Currency board in its pure form. 
3
 Poland decided to move to inflation targeting in 1998 and introduce it in 2000, Hungary also passed in mid-
2000, as well as Czech Republic - in 1997.   Romania introduced this scheme in 2005. 
4
 See Fountas and Karanasos (2007) for a brief survey of literature on all these aspects. 
5
 See also Hess and Moris (1996) and Grier and Grier (2006), among others, for positive relationship between 
these two variables. 
  
which is known as ‘Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis’ after the notation used by Grier and Perry 
(1998); is also supported by many empirical studies (see also Fountas et al. 2004). In sharp 
contrast to this view, Holland (1995) argues that central banks work for stability objectives, 
the so-called ‘stabilizing Fed hypothesis’. As soon as uncertainty increases after inflation, 
central bank reacts by contracting money supply to avoid the welfare loss due to uncertainty; 
making this inflation and nominal uncertainty relationship negative. This hypothesis has been 
further complemented by empirical studies of Grier and Perry (2000) and Grier et al. (2004) 
etc. Finally, some mixed evidence based on country specific and time specific results are also 
documented by Caprole and Kontonikas (2009) among others. 
Regarding the inflation effects on real growth variability, literature usually 
complements the signalling extraction model of Lucas (1973). In this environment, inflation 
obscures the signalling channel of production and hence inhibits the output growth. Producers 
increase their production as an immediate response of price changes but as soon as they come 
to know the overall price change, they reverse back these decisions causing higher output 
growth variability due to inflation. 
Likewise, inflation uncertainty also directly impacts output growth and its volatility. 
Nominal uncertainty influences growth through different channels; i.e through its effect on the 
long-term real interest rate, real wage, tax revenues, long-term investment plans of consumers 
and investors etc. Since the effects on all these channels are different and interdependent on 
the other policy organs, literature does not provide any precise and overwhelming evidence 
regarding the effect of uncertainty on output growth or its volatility. Pindyck (1991) 
substantiates an adverse effect of uncertainty on growth that appears through investment 
channel. Taylor (1979), on the other hand, assumes an inverse relationship between real and 
nominal uncertainties in the presence of real world rigidities. To illustrate, if supply shock hits 
the economy and real wages are rigid downward, real output fluctuations can only be avoided 
at the cost of higher nominal uncertainty. These results have been empirically supported by 
Cecchetti and Krause (2001), among others. 
Finally, the relation between real growth volatility and growth has also been widely 
treated in the literature with (again) contradictory findings. First, according to Devereux’s 
(1989) model, higher growth uncertainty, results lower degree of indexation. This further 
makes it easier for the policy maker to use inflation surprises as a tool for higher output 
objectives. This all ends up with high average inflation and lower growth. Second, according 
to Black (1987), uncertainty increases the degree of specialization in an economy and hence 
yields more growth. His work on business cycle fluctuations elaborate that higher degree of 
specialization in an economy will result a positive real growth and volatility nexus (see 
Fountas and Karanasos (2007) and references therein for empirical support on this view).  
Regarding the selected sample of the present study, the new EU member states, we 
could point out again that all abovementioned theoretical links between inflation, growth and 
their uncertainties are carried out within the two fundamentally different monetary regimes 
(Currency Board and Inflation targeting), each of which strives to achieve both nominal and 
real stability as well as their predictability. Monetary regime by itself is an essential 
institutional environment which lays down the basic features of the whole set of behavioral 
relationships  (Maurer,  2006). 
3. Empirical analyses and interpretations 
3.1 Methodology 
Here we briefly discuss our selected exponential GARCH (E-GARCH) model that has been 
actualized to estimate the stochastic component of real and nominal uncertainties for our new 
EU members. This specific functional form has an advantage of taking into account the 
  
asymmetry in the inflation and uncertainty relationship and hence provides a better way to test 
the Friedman’s view. Since according to Friedman, higher inflation exerts larger uncertainty, 
using a symmetric variance of the error term (the standard GARCH models) as measure of 
uncertainty is a poor approach to test this hypothesis (see Brunner and Hess, 1993 for more 
details). Following the traditional notations, let t and ty represent the inflation and the output 
growth, respectively and define the residual vector t as ( )t t yt    . A more specific form of 
the bivariate VAR (p) model can be described as; 
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Here ‘i’ represents a change in the nominal interest rate. For the Currency Board 
economies we have used interest rate of European Central Bank (ECB). Here is one of the 
main difference between the both monetary regimes, in the case of Currency Boards because 
of the lack of own policy rate, and because of the mechanics of the regime, the ECB policy 
rate directly shape home market interest rate. ‘Oil’ in the first equation shows oil price 
changes as exogenous variable and ‘yEU’ represents European Union Industrial Production 
Index (IPI); to incorporate the effect of regional shocks on the domestic output. Our volatility 
estimates are based on the vector autoregressive (VAR) models and the specific number of 
lags is selected using Akiake Information Criteria (AIC) and Schwarz Information Criteria 
(SIC).  Since E-GARCH specification models the logarithm of the conditional variance, it 
does not impose non-negativity constraint on the coefficients. Uncertainty in both variables is 
captured in the following way: 
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Here parameter ‘γ’ estimates the asymmetry in the relationship. When ‘γ’ is positive 
then positive inflation change causes more uncertainty than the negative one of the same 
magnitude. Our next step estimation consists of the Granger causality tests to see the exact 
direction of effects between real and nominal variables as well as their uncertainties. 
3.2 Data 
To test all these set of hypotheses, we use monthly data of six Eastern European economies 
over the period of 2000-01 to 2011-07, using International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2011). 
The selected sample includes three currency board economies; Bulgaria, Estonia, and 
Lithuania, and three inflation targeting countries Czech Republic, Romania, and Poland. For 
these economies, inflation is represented by the annualized monthly difference of the 
logarithm of the Consumer Price Index 1[ log( / ) 1200]t t tCPI CPI    and real output growth 
is also measured accordingly 1[ log( / ) 1200].t t ty IPI IPI    Our stationarity tests indicate that 
all the variables are non-stationary at their level and stationary at first difference, hence we 
  
use first difference of all variables in the analysis.
6
 Summary statistics of both these variables 
are given in Table (1). 
Table (1) Data Description 
 Inflation (π) Industrial Production Growth (y) 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
JB 
Normality 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
JB 
Normality 
Bulgaria 5.73 3.34 4.98
c
 4.17 9.92 50.69
a
 
Estonia 4.14 2.85 2.42 5.78 14.08 75.29
a
 
Lithuania 3.01 3.33 17.08
a
 5.83 11.23 11.22
a
 
Czech Rep 2.46 1.83 13.34
a
 4.33 8.98 83.08
a
 
Poland 2.85 1.58 3.14 5.63 6.75 14.56
a
 
Romania 11.21 7.71 53.13
a
 3.81 5.82 47.81
a
 
One prominent difference between inflation targeting and the currency board economies 
is the standard deviation of y and π which is higher for the Currency Board economies than 
for the Inflation targeting countries. Since Inflation targeting regime explicitly focuses on the 
price stability, it reduces real uncertainty more efficiently than the Currency Board based 
monetary regime. Once nominal exchange rate is fixed under Currency Board, the uncertainty 
move to other variables especially price level. The case of Romania is distinctive. The 
inflation volatility is higher, because of a whole unstable economic and political climate. 
3.3 Empirical Results 
In order to apply our selected AR (p) - E-GARCH (1, 1) model we need to have the estimates 
of real and nominal uncertainty that are free from autocorrelation but contain 
heteroscedasticity; to justify the manipulation of this econometric technique. To do this, we 
ran AR (12) model and obtained the following results for the residuals.
7
  
Table (2) Preliminary tests on the residuals 
  Bulgaria Estonia Lithuania Czech Rep Poland Romania 
Inflation 
Q12 5.56 4.46 4.45 4.72 12.05 6.01 
Q1
2
 5.26
a
 0.01 0.23 7.35
a
 7.43
a
 0.07 
Q12
2
 10.32 4.46 8.48 9.58 17.45 19.66
c
 
Output 
Q12 7.32 4.82 9.11 8.25 6.91 11.33 
Q1
2
 4.01
b
 0.33 4.45
b
 5.74
a
 1.39 3.17
c
 
Q12
2
 10.68 26.71
a
 10.43 31.12
a
 25.12
a
 23.77
a
 
Notes: Q12 is the 12
th
-order Ljung-Box test for standardized autocorrelation. Q1
2
 and Q12
2 
are tests for ARCH 
effects using squared residuals. a, b and c show 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
Our residual diagnostics (Table 2) show no sign of remaining autocorrelation for both 
inflation and output growth series. However the LM style ARCH tests show conditional 
heteroscedasticity in all cases except for two inflation series (Estonia and Lithuania). 
Although our square residuals are not so compelling in few cases, the results were, however, 
significant on some other lags; not mentioned here. Hence we use our AR (p) – E-GARCH 
(1,1) test for both inflation and output series and the results are presented in Table (3). 
                                                 
6
 We use Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Peron (PP) tests for stationarity. The results 
are available on demand. 
7
 Our AR (12) specification is based on the minimum values of AIC and SIC under alternative lags for 
all countries. 
  
Table (3) Estimates of AR(p)-EGARCH(1,1) model of inflation 
 Bulgaria Estonia Lithuania Czech Rp Poland Romania 
Intercept a0  -0.025
a
 0.001 -0.017
a
 0.021
a
 -0.005 0.006 
a1 0.228
a
 0.227
a
 0.105 -0.111
a
 0.448
a
 0.135
a
 
a2 0.124   0.152
b
 -0.255
a
  
a3  0.091 0.149
b
    
a4 -0.138
c
    0.19
c
 0.116
c
 
a5     -0.407
a
  
a6 -0.199
a
   -0.147
c
 0.378
a
 0.146
b
 
a7   -0.106 0.053 0.378
a
 -0.137
c
 
a8   -0.098  0.233
b
  
a10 -0.128
c
 0.093  -0.102
c
 -0.272
a
 -0.015 
a11  -0.106   0.388
a
  
a12 -0.038 0.012 0.246
a
 0.282
a
  0.008 
ρ 0.026
a
 0.036 0.018
a
 0.021
a
 0.006 -0.005 
η -0.0079
b
 -0.004 -0.005 0.003
b
 0.001 -0.0003 
Ʈ  -0.0001
c
  -0.0001
a
 -8.5E-05
c
  
α0 -5.048
b
 -4.55 -8.56 -16.971
a
 21.435
a
 -2.014
b
 
α1 0.511
b
 0.57 0.185 -0.519
a
 -0.839
a
 0.782
a
 
β 0.318 -0.19 -0.406b -0.661b -0.295 -0.52a 
γ 0.615a -0.17 0.128 0.523a -0.081 0.116b 
R
2
 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.39 0.37 0.11 
F-Statistics 1.84 2.12 2.11 3.78 3.58 0.88 
Log Likelihood 397.96 558.61 459.09 440.25 514.06 464.52 
Q12 7.817 7.92 4.63 5.31 11.61 8.14 
Q1
2
 0.01 0.04 0.41 0.01 0.65 0.19 
Q12
2
 5.36 4.88 7.98 10.27 10.59 12.09 
Notes: Q12 is the 12
th
-order Ljung-Box test for standardized autocorrelation. Q1
2
 and Q12
2 
are tests for ARCH 
effects using squared residuals. a, b and c show 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
Here we present the results of inflation equations (1) and (3) for all countries.  Most of 
the autoregressive coefficients are significant in almost all countries, showing strong 
influence of previous inflation to determine prices today. On our selected covariates, changes 
in previous period output amplify the level of inflation today. Effect of interest rate changes is 
different; it augments inflation when domestic interest rate increases (i.e in case of Czech 
Republic) and decreases inflation when ECB interest rate goes up (i.e in Bulgaria). One 
interpretation can be that higher interest rate in the ECB can result capital flight from this 
Currency Board based economy which further lowers reserve money, money supply and as a 
result inflation in this small open economy. However this systematically different effect is 
significant only in these two countries. Oil price increases lower the inflation in all cases 
where their impact turns out to be significant. 
Turning to our volatility results, GARCH impact is significant in all cases where our 
first step residual tests have identified the presence of heterscedasticity in the inflation 
process. The most interesting results come from our asymmetric parameter ‘γ’ (its sign is 
positive in all significant cases). When γ>0, this substantiates the Friedman and Ball effect 
regarding the impact of inflation volatility on its level. Higher inflation is indeed more volatile 
and hence more costly in terms of its impact on relative prices and output growth in an 
economy. Since welfare cost of inflation increases at its higher levels, price stability becomes 
an optimal choice for these economies; irrespective of the differences in the monetary policy 
regimes in these countries. These are the cases of Bulgaria, Lithuania, Czech Republic and 
Romania. When γ<0, meaning that higher inflation is negatively related with inflation 
volatility, as in the case of Estonia and Poland, the results seem intutive. Estonian Currency 
  
Board is extremely credible, has a long successful history, and this is probably the reason of 
the negative correlation, and its difference with the other two Currency Boards countries. 
Bulgarian Currency Board was introduced after deep crisis, in Lithuania there were always 
hesitations about the commitment to this monetary regime. Concerning the Polish case experts 
share the view that Central bank has established good reputation and this in some respect is 
confirmed by negative sign of ‘γ’. 
Table (4) Estimates of AR(p)-EGARCH(1,1) model of Output Growth 
 Bulgaria Estonia Lithuania Czech Rp Poland Romania 
Intercept b0  0.271
a
 -0.005 0.664
a
 1.159
a
 0.624
a
 1.154
a
 
b1 0.133
b
  0.281
a
 0.118 0.225
c
 0.026 
b2 0.324
a
 -0.101 0.217
b
 -0.022 0.196
b
 -0.094
b
 
b3 0.179
a
 0.083  0.034 0.181
b
 -0.061 
b4  0.084 -0.293
a
 -0.063 -0.045 -0.021 
b5  0.377
a
  -0.101 -0.081 -0.039 
b6     0.139
c
  
b7     -0.202
a
  
b8   -0.188
a
 -0.141
c
 -0.023 0.049 
b9   0.116
c
 -0.161
c
 -0.033 -0.318
a
 
b10 -0.147
a
   -0.356
a
 -0.153
b
 -0.149
a
 
b12 0.631
a
 0.028 0.187
a
 0.512
a
 0.599
a
 0.431
a
 
δ -0.325 -0.014 -0.721 1.442 -2.039
c
 -0.761 
λ  0.001
a
 -0.007
a
 -0.007
a
 -0.001 -0.004
a
 
α0 -2.728
a
 -2.554
b
 -2.573 -1.488 -1.844 -10.53
a
 
α1 0.681
a
 0.719
a
 0.619
b
 0.791
a
 0.823
a
 -0.421
b
 
β 0.812a 0.367 0.459 0.178 0.734b 1.11a 
γ 0.303 0.652a 0.137 0.223 0.249 0.125 
R
2
 0.67 0.08 0.54 0.73 0.67 0.63 
F-Statistics 14.59 0.874 10.22 14.11 8.52 9.56 
Log Likelihood 204.69 298.72 168.38 205.86 236.62 225.44 
Q12 12.06 5.24 8.94 10.97 11.79 6.85 
Q1
2
 0.66 0.11 0.38 1.46 0.48 0.11 
Q12
2
 13.37 15.06 14.88 8.68 8.75 11.79 
Notes: Q12 is the 12
th
-order Ljung-Box test for standardized autocorrelation. Q1
2
 and Q12
2 
are tests for ARCH 
effects using squared residuals. a, b and c show 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
In the next step, we want to see how different monetary policy regimes impact the 
output growth or its variability in these emerging markets (growth equation 2 and 4). Here 
again we obtain standard results for the relationship between growth variability and overall 
output growth. One notable outcome appears from the fact that in almost all economies (other 
than Estonia, probably because of its large trade share with Russia), regional shocks (in our 
case EU) lower growth of these economies. Since EU is the largest trading partner of our 
selected economies, fluctuations in the industrial production of EU countries exert negative 
impact on the output growth of these economies. Parameter δ, that shows trade off between 
inflation and growth volatility, show negative value (except for Czech Republic) in 
accordance to dominant theories. Asymmetry in the output growth and its uncertainty is again 
positive, albeit, insignificant in most of the cases. 
Finally, in order to know the exact nature of the relationship and the direction of effects 
between real and nominal variables, we ran Granger causality tests (table 5). Various 
directions of effects have been tested for different variables; nevertheless, here we present 
some important channels through which real and nominal variables can influence each other.  
In most of the cases, inflation yields high nominal and real uncertainty; again supporting 
  
Friedman and Ball hypothesis. For example according to panel A inflation causes inflation 
uncertainty in Romania, Bulgaria and Lithuania, but does not cause it in Estonia. Again the 
Estonian case is particular because of the high level credibility of Estonian currency board. 
Similar manifestation could be seen in panel C, when again in Estonian case the output 
growth reduces inflation uncertainty. Nominal uncertainty, however, does not lead to a 
significant real uncertainty. In the same way, output growth uncertainty aggravates the 
nominal uncertainty and real growth in almost all significant cases. 
Table (5) Bivariate Granger-causality tests on the relationship between inflation and output 
growth as well as their uncertainties 
Optimal Lag Bulgaria Estonia Lithuania Czech Rp. Poland Romania 
Panel (A) H0: Inflation does not Granger-cause inflation uncertainty 
4 lags 29.41
a
(+) 43.62
a
 (-) 18.76
a
 (+) 9.89
a
 (-) 4.68
a
 (+) 11.07
a
 (+) 
8 lags 12.15
a
 (+) 23.37
a
 (-) 8.66
a
 (+) 4.92
a 
(-) 2.53
b
 (+) 7.29
a
 (+) 
12 lags
 
5.68
a
 (+) 17.57
a
 (-) 5.06
a
 (+) 4.54
a
 (-) 1.98
b
 (+) 4.49
a
 (+) 
Panel (B) H0 : Inflation does not Granger-cause output growth uncertainty 
4 lags 0.26 1.21 2.65
b
 (-) 1.21 1.26 0.82 
8 lags 0.84 0.76 1.11 2.32
b
 (+) 1.48 0.56 
12 lags
 
0.92 0.86 0.78 2.48
a 
(+) 1.73
b
 (+) 0.61 
Panel (C) H0 :Inflation uncertainty does not Granger-cause output growth uncertainty 
4 lags 0.06 0.02 0.55 3.05
b
 (+) 1.16 1.75 
8 lags 0.32 0.56 1.41 3.66
a
 (+) 0.93 1.11 
12 lags
 
0.27 0.57 1.42 7.58
a
 (+) 0.97 0.32 
Panel (C) H0 :Output Growth does not Granger-cause inflation uncertainty 
4 lags 0.46 3.42
a
 (-) 1.83 0.83 0.98 0.48 
8 lags 3.01
b
 (-) 2.23
a
 (-) 1.48 0.37 1.07 0.58 
12 lags
 
1.52 1.92
b
 (-) 1.23 0.79 1.54 0.45 
Panel (D) H0 :Output growth uncertainty does not Granger-cause inflation uncertainty 
4 lags 0.24 1.52 0.39 0.82 1.42 0.25 
8 lags 0.18 1.13 2.42
b
 (+) 0.58 1.98
c
 (+) 0.43 
12 lags
 
0.28 1.28 1.78
b
 (+) 0.57 2.54
a
 (+) 0.89 
Panel (D) H0 : Output growth uncertainty does not Granger-cause output growth 
4 lags 2.72
b
 (+) 2.73
b
 (-) 1.54 11.51
a
 (+) 5.45
a
 (+) 3.74
a
 (+) 
8 lags 2.28
b
 (+) 1.54 1.81
c
 (-) 4.57
a
 (+) 1.65 2.09
b
 (+)
 
12 lags
 
2.25
b
 (+) 1.43 1.09 2.31
b
 (+) 1.92
b
 (+) 1.87
b
 (+) 
Notes: The numbers in the first column give the lag structure. Figures are F-statistics. A (+) (-) indicates that the 
sum of the lagged coefficients of the causing variable is (positive) (negative). a, b and c show 1%, 5% and 10% 
level of significance, respectively. The bold (underlined) numbers indicate the optimal lag length chosen by AIC 
(SIC). 
4. Conclusion 
On the whole, the empirical results do not allow judging which monetary regime is more 
appropriate and is reasonable to assume, as Jeffrey Frankel has said few years ago that all is 
about the specific assessments and depends upon the concrete characteristics of each 
economy. Evidence of the importance of specific historic background in determining the 
effectiveness of any monetary regime is clear, for example, in case of Estonia, where 
Currency Board fits well into the overall institutional setting and ideologically liberal climate. 
Or, Poland, where discretionary monetary policy is conducted by Central bank with a 
well established reputation. 
But there is something else. The results of our study lead to consider the negotiation 
process, legal and normative convergence with the EU that occur after 2000, expectations 
dynamics of economic agents to the future EU integration,  and subsequently EU membership 
  
itself, as major economic anchors, which largely absorbed the importance and specificity 
of internal anchors (monetary regime). EU enlargement is one of the possible explanations for 
numbing of the differences and the lack of distinction between the two regimes in terms of 
inflation, growth and their uncertainties. 
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